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PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND NORMATIVE POWER 
SKEPTICISM 
Jody S. Kraus∗ 
Companion to:  Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and 
Promise, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1603 (2009). 
Correspondence accounts of the relationship between contract and 
promise hold either that contract law is justified to the extent it enforces 
a corresponding moral responsibility for a promise or unjustified to the 
extent it undermines promissory morality by refusing to enforce a 
corresponding moral responsibility for a promise.  In “The 
Correspondence of Contract and Promise,” I claim that contract scholars 
have mistakenly presumed that they can assess the correspondence 
between contract and promise without first providing a theory of self-
imposed moral responsibility that explains and justifies the promise 
principle.1  To illustrate the dependence of correspondence accounts of 
contract law on a theory of self-imposed moral responsibility, I 
demonstrate how a “personal sovereignty” account of individual 
autonomy—one of the most familiar and intuitive theories of self-
imposed moral responsibility—explains how and why, contrary to 
existing correspondence theories, promissory responsibility corresponds 
to the objective theory of intent, the doctrines of consideration and 
promissory estoppel, and most remedial contract doctrines, including 
the bar against mandatory punitive damages, the foreseeability limitation 
on consequential damages, the mitigation doctrine, and expectation 
damages, the paradigm example of a contract doctrine alleged to 
conflict with promissory morality.  I conclude that correspondence 
theorists can defend their critiques of contract law only by rejecting the 
personal sovereignty theory of self-imposed moral responsibility, 
defending an alternative theory, and explaining why any resulting 
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divergence between contract law and its requirements is objectionable. 
The personal sovereignty account of promising therefore plays a 
crucial role in my analysis of correspondence theories of contract.  For 
purposes of that analysis, I described how personal sovereignty explains 
promissory obligation: 
[P]ersonal sovereignty . . . recognizes the fundamental right of 
individuals not only to choose their system of ends but also to 
choose how to pursue those ends.  Promising constitutes a 
particularly valuable means for pursuing ends. . . . [I]f morality 
itself can provide individuals a valuable means of pursuing their 
ends simply by recognizing the individual moral power to 
undertake self-imposed moral responsibilities, a moral theory 
committed to personal sovereignty as a fundamental moral 
value would have no grounds for refusing to recognize such a 
power.  Personal sovereignty therefore counts the moral 
capacity to undertake self-imposed moral responsibilities as a 
basic individual liberty.  By affirming the fundamental right of 
individuals to choose how to pursue their desired ends, 
personal sovereignty necessarily affirms the category of moral 
responsibility that obligation describes.  The moral power to 
make—and thus the moral obligation to keep—a promise is 
therefore an axiom of personal sovereignty.2 
According to this account of promising, individuals have the 
normative power to undertake self-imposed moral responsibilities (i.e., 
moral obligations) because such a power enhances personal 
sovereignty.3  A moral theory with a foundational commitment to 
personal sovereignty would therefore give moral effect to attempts to 
undertake such a responsibility.  Although I find this an intuitive 
understanding of the logic of moral justification, some philosophers 
have doubted that morality can simply “give moral effect” to attempts to 
create moral responsibility.  They argue that this view begs the 
fundamental question of whether individuals have the normative power 
to create moral responsibilities, as promises purport to do, by simply 
communicating an intention to undertake such responsibility.  In Part I 
of this companion piece, I explain the skeptical argument that has been 
leveled against other theories of promissory obligation.  In Part II, I 
argue that it has no force against the personal sovereignty account I 
offer. 
 
2. Kraus, supra note 1, at 1609. 
3. For the distinction between moral obligations and duties, see id. at 1614 (“Moral 
duties designate those responsibilities to which morality subjects individuals solely by 
virtue of their status as moral agents alone, while moral obligations designate those 
responsibilities to which morality subjects moral agents only if they have voluntarily 
chosen to undertake them.  Unlike moral duties, moral obligations are self-imposed.”). 
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I.  THE SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT 
Joseph Raz’s account of promissory obligation holds that promises 
are morally binding because many intrinsically valuable special 
relationships are possible only if they are.4  Raz’s view therefore holds 
that individuals have the normative power to promise because such a 
power would be valuable.  The contemporary version of the skeptical 
argument rejects this argument.  Thus, Michael Pratt argues:   
That it is desirable to be able to bind oneself to another by 
means of communicating an intention to do so, provides no 
reason to suppose that it is possible to obligate oneself in that 
manner.  The value of making binding promises does not, in 
other words, provide any reason for thinking that the rule that 
promises ought to be kept is valid.5 
Pratt here echoes an objection that Don Regan years ago leveled against 
Raz’s account of why consent is morally binding.  Regan takes the claim 
that consent is morally binding to mean that consent provides an 
individual with a reason for action that weighs in the ultimate balance of 
his reasons for acting in accordance with his consent.  Regan explains, 
however, that Raz’s argument proceeds from the premise that “[i]t 
would be a good thing if consent were binding” to the conclusion that 
“[c]onsent is binding.”6  But the argument form “It would be a good 
thing if X.  Therefore, X” is a nonsequitur.  Thus, Regan claims, the 
argument “It would be a good thing if promises were binding.  
Therefore they are,” is invalid as well.7  Although Regan acknowledges 
that no one believes the general argument form is valid—no one believes 
that we can simply infer that X is true because it would be a good thing if 
X were true—he speculates that philosophers believe it is valid when 
 
4. According to Raz,  
[A promise] creates a special bond, binding the promisor to be, in the matter of 
the promise, partial to the promisee.  It obliges the promisor to regard the claim 
of the promisee as not just one of the many claims that every person has for his 
respect and help but as having peremptory force.  Hence, [promissory obligation] 
principles can only be justified if the creation of such special relationships 
between people is held to be valuable. . . . [Promissory obligation] principles 
[depend] on the intrinsic desirability of forms of life in which people create or 
acknowledge special bonds between them and certain other individuals. 
Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in Law, Morality, and Society:  Essays in Honour of 
H.L.A. Hart 210, 227–28 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977) [hereinafter Raz, Promises 
and Obligations]. 
5. Michael Pratt, Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations, 26 Law & Phil. 531, 
567 (2007).  Similarly, Pratt writes that “[e]lsewhere Raz writes that ‘promises are binding 
because it is desirable to make it possible for people to bind themselves and give rights to 
others if they so wish.’  If by ‘binding’ Raz means ‘morally binding’ then, again, the 
objection is manifest:  that it is desirable does not make it so.”  Id. at 567 n.84 (citation 
omitted) (quoting Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 Proc. of 
the Aristotelian Soc’y (Supplementary Volumes) 79, 101 (1972)). 
6. Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value:  Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 995, 1036–37 (1989). 
7. Id. at 1037. 
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applied to morality: 
The underlying idea would be that morality is not a set of facts 
about the universe, but rather a set of ideas and practices we 
invent.  So, if we have a moral belief, and if it is a good thing 
that we have that moral belief, that is all the warrant one could 
possibly want for saying the moral belief is true.8 
Regan rejects this view, roughly, because he believes that whether an 
action is morally right or wrong turns on moral facts independent of our 
beliefs about our moral responsibilities.  For Regan, an action is morally 
right or wrong because of its consequences:  “[P]eople ought to do acts 
which can be expected to have good consequences.”9  The moral 
assessment of actions, therefore, turns on whether they promote good or 
bad consequences.10  Thus, Regan concludes that promises are not 
morally binding—they do not provide the promisor with a reason for 
keeping the promise that always weighs in the balance of his reasons for 
action.  Instead, their moral force depends entirely on the consequences 
of keeping them.  That the promisor promised to do the act provides no 
independent reason for doing it.  Regan concludes that whether it would 
be a good thing, from some point of view, that a promise created a moral 
obligation to perform the promised act has no bearing on whether it in 
fact does create a moral obligation. 
David Owens traces this fundamental skepticism about the moral 
force of promising back to David Hume.  Owens reconstructs Hume’s 
problem nicely: 
What makes breach of promise a wronging is that someone has 
communicated the intention that it be a wronging . . . . Now 
something can be declared to be wrongful in this way whether 
or not it is harmful or constitutes unjust enrichment, or has any 
further feature in which human beings might sensibly take an 
interest.  So such wrongfulness raises the problem of bare 
wronging:  What sense is there in refraining from doing 
something simply because it has been declared to be wrongful?  
Conversely, how could bare wronging, wrongings which have 
no adverse effect on anything that matters to us come into 
being unless we do indeed have the power to create them by 
declaration?11 
 
8. Id. at 1037–38.   
9. Donald H. Regan, Reasons, Authority, and the Meaning of “Obey”:  Further 
Thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law, 3 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 3, 27 (1990) 
[hereinafter Regan, The Meaning of “Obey”]. 
10. For example, Regan suggests “[t]hat an act is one of relieving suffering is an 
intrinsic reason for doing the act—the relief of suffering matters in itself.”  Id. at 26.  
Regan does allow that promising might provide an evidentiary, and therefore defeasible, 
reason for performing the promised act if it could be shown that promise-keeping is on 
average conducive to promoting good consequences.  But on this view, promises are only 
prima facie binding.  They do not bind when the promisor reasonably believes that 
performance does not promote good consequences.  In such instances, rather than 
providing a reason for action that is outweighed by other reasons, the promise provides 
no reason for action at all.   
11. David Owens, The Problem with Promising 7 (Feb. 12, 2009) (unpublished 
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As Owens explains, the puzzlement underlying this question stems from 
the assumption that it “makes sense to do something because you are 
obliged to do it only if the discharge of this obligation would serve some 
interest, where the interest in question can be specified without using 
the notion of an obligation.”12  Most promise theorists presume that this 
interest must be a human interest, something which it makes sense to 
want or value.13  So the problem is to explain why keeping a promise 
serves some sensible interest or value that human beings have.  But 
unless the relevant interest or value is necessarily promoted by keeping a 
promise, or necessarily undermined by breaking a promise, any account 
of promising that traces its moral force to its effects on a distinct interest 
or value will render promissory obligation contingent, dependent 
entirely on whether keeping a promise in any given instance promotes 
that interest or value.  So conceived, it seems impossible to provide an 
account of promising that vindicates the common belief that promises 
create moral obligations irrespective of the consequences of breach—
that promises always provide promisors with a reason to perform the 
promised act, even if those reasons might sometimes be outweighed by 
other competing reasons.  In short, the skeptical argument originating 
with Hume and reformulated by Regan and Pratt claims that promising 
could create a genuinely deontic obligation only if promise-breaking 
necessarily undermines some independent human interest or value.14 
II.  A DEONTIC REPLY 
In this Part, I explain how the personal sovereignty account of 
promising I offer provides a deontic foundation for promissory 
obligation that does not depend on the effects of promise-keeping or 
promise-breaking.  In so doing, I explain why I reject the implicit 
premise that underwrites Humean skepticism. 
The personal sovereignty account of promising has much in 
common with the account of promising Raz defends.  According to Raz: 
[T]o acknowledge the validity of voluntary obligations . . . is to 
accept a rather unfashionable view of practical reason.  It is a 
view according to which what a man ought to do depends not 
only on the ways things happen to turn out in the world . . . . 
 
working paper, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342060.   
12. Id. at 3. 
13. Id. 
14. I use the term “deontic” here to describe any moral theory that does not reduce 
an action’s moral rightness or wrongness entirely to its consequences.  See e.g., Larry 
Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2007), at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-
deontological/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[D]eontological theories are best 
understood in contrast to consequentialist ones. . . . [D]eontologists of all stripes hold 
that some choices cannot be justified by their effects—that no matter how morally good 
their consequences, some choices are morally forbidden. . . . For deontologists, what 
makes a choice right is its conformity with a moral norm.”). 
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What one ought to do depends in part on oneself . . . [in part] 
because the agent has the power intentionally to shape the 
form of his moral world, to obligate himself to follow certain 
goals, or to create bonds and alliances with certain people and 
not others.  It seems to me that many have become so 
preoccupied with the way considerations of human welfare 
affect what one ought to do that they become blind to the 
existence of this other dimension to our practical life.15 
I share Raz’s conviction that promising is a crucial moral device for 
pursuing one’s projects and creating special relationships.  This much, 
which few would doubt, is enough to explain why individuals would care 
about having the power to undertake self-imposed obligations.  But Raz 
also argues that promises create moral obligations only “if the creation 
of . . . special relationships between people is held to be valuable.”16  As 
we’ve seen, for Raz, the justification of promissory obligation depends on 
“the intrinsic desirability of forms of life in which people create or 
acknowledge special bonds between them and certain other 
individuals.”17  Thus, 
The right to promise is based on the promisor’s interest to be 
able to forge special bonds with other people. . . . Those who 
assign sufficient importance to the interest people have in 
being able to impose on themselves obligations to other people 
as a means of creating special bonds with other people believe 
in a right to promise. . . . [P]eople’s interest in being able to 
bind themselves is the basis of a power to promise which they 
possess and of an obligation to keep promises they make.18 
The personal sovereignty account, however, does not ground the 
normative power to make, and the moral obligation to keep, a promise 
on its causal effects, including their role in facilitating the pursuit of 
projects and forming special relationships.  Instead, it derives the 
normative power to make, and the moral obligation to keep, a promise 
from the foundational normative premise that individuals are morally 
entitled to decide how to live their lives as they see fit, consistent with a 
like liberty for others.  The personal sovereignty account understands 
Raz’s conclusion that “the agent has the power intentionally to shape the 
form of his moral world”19 to follow not from the valuable activities and 
relationships it makes possible but from the same prior normative 
commitment to a conception of the individual as sovereign over all 
matters exclusively affecting his own life.  Just as individuals have the sole 
 
15. Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 4, at 228.   
16. Id.  
17. Id.   
18. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 173–74 (1986) [hereinafter Raz, Morality 
of Freedom].  Similarly, Raz argues: 
[T]he power to promise and the right to promise are distinct notions.  But both 
stem from a common core, i.e. the interest of persons to be able to forge 
normative bonds with others.  That is why they coexist, and one has the power to 
promise if and only if one has the right to do so. 
Id. at 174. 
19. Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 4, at 228.  
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right to decide whether they will eat meat, devote themselves to a 
meditative practice, or become a lawyer, so they can decide for 
themselves whether to undertake a moral responsibility they are 
otherwise free to avoid. 
If morality is committed to the value of personal sovereignty, then it 
affords individuals the maximum morally permissible control over “the 
shape of their moral world.”  To be sure, a moral theory that recognizes 
the fundamental value of personal sovereignty cannot delegate 
individuals’ control over the moral duties to which they are subject 
because these are grounded in the principle of equal respect for the 
personal sovereignty of all individuals.  To enhance one individual’s 
personal sovereignty by allowing him to avoid moral responsibility to 
others necessarily and simultaneously diminishes respect for the 
personal sovereignty of the other individuals to whom that individual 
would no longer be morally responsible.  Moral duties therefore define, 
rather than fall within, the realm over which individuals are personally 
sovereign.  In contrast, by recognizing the power of individuals to 
undertake moral obligations, morality enhances everyone’s control over 
their lives—their power to “shape the form of their moral world”—
without diminishing the personal sovereignty of others. 
Thus, although this account of personal sovereignty does not rest on 
its role in enabling individuals to realize valuable relationships or to 
pursue their valuable projects, it is nonetheless animated by the same 
ideas that inform the conception of autonomy that Raz embraces: 
The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that 
people should make their own lives.  The autonomous person is 
a (part) author of his own life.  The ideal of personal autonomy 
is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own 
destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout 
their lives.20 
If morality imposes duties and recognizes rights that it derives from the 
values it takes to be fundamental, and personal sovereignty is among the 
fundamental values morality affirms, then morality must recognize the 
duties and rights derived from personal sovereignty.  The ability to 
undertake self-imposed moral obligations enhances personal sovereignty 
by affording individuals more control over the norms that apply to them.  
A moral theory therefore cannot consistently affirm the fundamental 
value of personal sovereignty and yet deny the power and obligation of 
promising. 
The personal sovereignty account of promissory responsibility, 
however, appears to commit precisely the fallacy that Hume, Regan, and 
Pratt have identified.  Having the normative power to create self-imposed 
obligations by promising may well enhance personal sovereignty.  Yet the 
skeptical view denies that this constitutes an argument to demonstrate 
that such a power exists.  As Regan puts the point, from the fact that it 
 
20. Raz, Morality of Freedom, supra note 18, at 369.   
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would be desirable if something were true, it certainly does not follow as 
a general matter that it is true.  Why should this be otherwise when it 
comes to moral truth?  Perhaps personal sovereignty does not include 
the power to undertake self-imposed moral obligations because self-
imposed moral obligations simply do not exist.  One can no more 
demonstrate the existence of the normative power of promising by 
observing that this power would enhance personal sovereignty than one 
could demonstrate the existence of a million dollars in my bank account 
by observing that this money would enhance my financial sovereignty.  
What is needed is an argument explaining how promissory obligation is 
possible, not an argument demonstrating why it would be a good thing if 
it were. 
The skeptical argument proceeds, however, on the basis of a crucial 
suppressed premise that Owens has identified:  “[T]he problem of bare 
wronging arises only if we impose some substantive constraints on what 
kinds of consideration can make sense of an action.”21  Thus, many 
philosophers believe that an adequate account of promissory obligation 
must provide an account that explains the moral force of a promise in 
terms of more basic, normatively primitive, values and interests, such as 
fairness, reciprocity, well-being, harm, and the like.  Hume accounts for 
promissory obligation by explaining its role in providing valuable social 
coordination.  Regan would be satisfied by an account of promissory 
obligation that demonstrated why making and keeping promises 
reduced human suffering.22  Pratt accounts for promissory obligation by 
explaining its role in providing valuable assurance.23  And even Raz 
ultimately traces the normative power of promising to its role in 
facilitating valuable relationships.  In this sense, all of these philosophers 
are deeply consequentialist about the normative force of promissory 
morality. 
The personal sovereignty account, however, explains promissory 
morality not on the consequentialist ground that it promotes some other 
moral value, but on the purely deontic ground that it derives from a 
fundamental moral value.24  In Regan’s terms, it claims that personal 
 
21. Owens, supra note 11, at 7. 
22. “That an act is one of relieving suffering is an intrinsic reason for doing the act—
the relief of suffering matters in itself.  That is what we believe about the relief of 
suffering . . . .” Regan, The Meaning of “Obey,” supra note 9, at 26 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  However, Regan in fact offers no such account and believes promises do 
not generate genuine moral obligations. 
23. See Michael Pratt, Promises and Perlocutions, in Scanlon and Contractualism 93 
(Matt Matravers ed., 2003). 
24. Although the personal sovereignty account of promissory morality is distinct from 
Kant’s, both derive promissory morality from a conception of autonomy.  Kant argues that 
“freedom would be depriving itself of the use of its choice” were it not possible to acquire 
rights over “external objects of [one’s] choice.”  See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals 68–69 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797).  According to 
Kant, “another’s choice” is included in the category of “external objects of choice” and 
called “contract right”.  Id. at 90–91.  Kant does not appear to claim that autonomy 
specially requires the freedom to bind oneself according to one’s will.  Instead, his claim is 
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sovereignty, understood as entailing the power to undertake self-
imposed moral responsibility, is a fundamental moral value which no 
more stands in need of justification than does the claim that reducing 
human suffering is morally good.  Does it explain, as Hume requires, 
how a promise provides the promisor with a reason for action by 
explaining how keeping the promise serves some human interest, 
without using the notion of obligation?  Here I am once again inclined 
to follow Raz’s lead: 
[T]o the extent that promises are a source of voluntary 
obligations they are made by the exercise of normative powers.  
The obligatoriness of many promises can no doubt be 
explained on other grounds which do not depend on the fact 
that promises yield voluntary obligations.  But such 
explanations, correct and useful as they are, miss the essential 
point in the common conception of promises.25 
Furthermore, 
Because all types of voluntary obligations are characterized by 
being mandatory norms with content-independent justification, 
they are justified by the justification of the general norm that 
promises . . . ought to be respected; they are not justified by 
giving reasons for the desirability of each obligatory act in its 
particular circumstances.26 
Personal sovereignty itself provides, in Raz’s terms, “the justification 
of the general norms that promises ought to be respected.”  The 
fundamental moral value of according individuals the maximum 
permissible control over the moral norms that govern their lives explains 
why individuals have the power to make promises and promises provide 
reasons for action.  According to the personal sovereignty account, 
promisors should keep their promises not because of the consequences 
of performing or failing to perform the promised act or following or 
breaking a general norm of promising, but because morality treats 
personal sovereignty as a fundamental value that requires promises to be 
kept.  Simply put, promisors have reason to keep their promises because 
morality requires that promises be kept. 
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that it requires the freedom to receive commitments from others, and thus to have rights 
over their choices, analogous to our rights over external goods (i.e., property rights), 
whose possibility is similarly essential to full autonomy.  Thus, Kant argues that we deprive 
the will of its full scope if we confine it to “internal” objects of choice (i.e., our own 
actions), excluding external objects of choice (such as other things and other people).  
Hence, for Kant, full freedom requires the possibility of property and contracts. 
25. Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 Proc. of the 
Aristotelian Soc’y (Supplementary Volumes) 79, 98 (1972). 
26. Id. 
